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Abstract 
Exploration architecture studies identified the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) as one of the 
largest “gear ratio” items in a crewed Mars mission. Because every kilogram of mass 
ascended from the Martian surface requires seven kilograms or more of ascent propellant, it 
is desirable for the MAV to be as small and lightweight as possible. Analysis identified four 
key factors that drive MAV sizing: 
1) Number of crew: more crew members require more equipment—and a larger cabin 
diameter to hold that equipment—with direct implications to structural, thermal, 
propulsion, and power subsystem mass.  
2) Which suit is worn during ascent: Extravehicular Activity (EVA) type suits are 
physically larger and heavier than Intravehicular Activity (IVA) type suits and because 
they are less flexible, EVA suits require more elbow-room to maneuver in and out of. An 
empty EVA suit takes up about as much cabin volume as a crew member. 
3) How much time crew spends in the MAV:  less than about 12 hours and the MAV can be 
considered a “taxi” with few provisions for crew comfort. However, if the crew spends 
more than 12 consecutive hours in the MAV, it begins to look like a Habitat requiring 
more crew comfort items. 
4) How crew get into/out of the MAV: ingress/egress method drives structural mass (for 
example, EVA hatch vs. pressurized tunnel vs. suit port) as well as consumables mass 
for lost cabin atmosphere, and has profound impacts on surface element architecture. 
To minimize MAV cabin mass, the following is recommended: Limit MAV usage to 24 
consecutive hours or less; discard EVA suits on the surface and ascend wearing IVA suits; 
Limit MAV functionality to ascent only, rather than dual-use ascent/habitat functions; and 
ingress/egress the MAV via a detachable tunnel to another pressurized surface asset.  
Nomenclature 
g = Earth standard gravitational force 
kg = kilogram 
kN =  kilo Newton 
m = meter 
m3 = cubic meters 
I. Introduction 
Crewed Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) designs fall into one of two broad categories: 1) a relatively large habitable 
variant that serves as both ascent vehicle and habitat, either on the surface or in orbit; or 2) a much smaller taxi 
variant used only for a few hours during the actual ascent. The taxi variant requires another Mars surface asset for 
habitation. Note that in some architectures, the Mars ascent vehicle might also be used as the crew’s descent vehicle. 
 Ascent vehicles are generally regarded as the largest “gear ratio” item in a given architecture; in other words, 
every kilogram of an ascent vehicle needs more Earth-launched mass to do its job than most other architecture 
elements need. Even if ascent propellant can be manufactured on Mars, current technologies still require the ascent 
vehicle—and the propellant manufacturing plant—be launched from Earth, transported to and then descended onto 
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Mars, all of which entails a considerable amount of transit and descent propulsion mass. The overall gear ratio 
depends on end-to-end mission architecture. Analysis performed by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) estimates that the amount of propellant needed to boost a single kilogram of ascent vehicle 
to a 1-sol Mars orbit ranges between 3.5 kg (for an ideal rocket) to as much as 15 kg for a stage mass fraction of 
0.73. For the purpose of this exercise, the ascent gear ratio was assumed to be at the lower end of the range, or 7:1 
(seven kilograms of ascent propellant to boost every one kilogram of MAV inert mass). 
II. Factors That Drive Cabin Size 
 Clearly, the smaller the ascent vehicle, the lower the overall Earth-launched mass will be, which often means 
lower mission cost. Although many factors will affect a final MAV design, there are at least four key drivers for 
MAV cabin size: number of crew, what the crew is wearing during ascent, how much time crew spends in the MAV, 
and how crew get into or out of the MAV 
A. Number of Crew 
The number of crew drives MAV size both directly (more crew require a larger cabin volume) and indirectly (a 
larger cabin requires more thermal protection and longer avionics cables, which in turn requires more power mass, 
all of which drives ascent propellant load). For the purpose of this exercise, it was assumed that at least two crew 
members would land on Mars in even the most minimalist scenario, and the maximum crew complement would be 
limited by the Orion return vehicle, which is sized for up to six.   
More crew members simply require more physical elbow room. Work done as part of the Constellation 
Program’s Altair Lunar Lander project1 concluded that four standing crew members packed quite close together 
only need about a 1.8 m diameter cabin for a short duration ascent. Six crew obviously require more (Figure 1), 
probably at least a 2.2 m diameter cabin. Two crew members would require less volume, possibly as low as a 1.58 m 
diameter cabin. Note that many factors could increase taxi cabin diameter. For example, if crew ascend in recumbent 
seats (rather than standing up) or will be performing active piloting, then a larger cabin will be required. In any case, 
the structural mass difference between 1.58 m and 2.2 m diameter crew cabins could be quite significant.  
At 82.2 kg for a 50th percentile male crew member2, a six-crew MAV has to carry at least 328.8 kg more load 
than a two-crew MAV. With 95th percentile male crew, the difference grows to 394 kg. If each kilogram of MAV 
mass requires just seven kilograms of ascent propellant to reach a 
one-sol orbit, that extra 328 to 394 kg of crew will require as much 
as 2,758 kg more ascent propellant, which in turn requires larger 
propellant tanks and more structural support. 
 In addition to the crew, the MAV cabin must also accommodate 
crew equipment, even for short ascent durations. At a minimum, 
each crew member will need either a Portable Life Support System 
(PLSS) or an oxygen umbilical for cabin depressurization 
contingencies. At as much as 0.75 m x 0.56 m x 0.254 m for a 
PLSS, or 0.127 m diameter x 4.58 m long for even a short 
Intravehicular (IVA) oxygen umbilical, equipment volume quickly 
adds up, especially for six crew members. If the crew must remain 
inside the MAV for more than a few hours, additional equipment 
will be required (discussed below).   
 One obvious way to reduce MAV mass is to remove the 
pressure cabin altogether, such as the concept shown in Figure 2. 
Although this can reduce structural, thermal, and power mass, 
there are a number of disadvantages. An unpressurized MAV 
would require crew to remain in their Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA) suits, which is currently untenable for a lengthy (more than 
24 hour) ascent. Ascending in EVA suits contaminated with 
surface dust also poses the problem of planetary protection, which 
will require suit decontamination before the crew transfers into 
their transit vehicle (and further extends the time crew must remain 
in their suits). With no shell between the crew and the MAV’s 
reaction control system thrusters, EVA suit contamination is 
another concern because thruster plumes may damage the suits or 
Figure 1. Top view of Cabin: four vs. six 
crew.  
Figure 2. Unpressurized ascent vehicle 
concept. 
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deposit toxic contaminants that can then be transferred into the destination vehicle. Although eliminating the 
pressure cabin eliminates the mass of a pressurized docking system, this requires an EVA transfer into the orbiting 
transit habitat, which could be risky in the event of an incapacitated crew member. This concept precludes dual use 
of the MAV for surface habitation, forcing the architecture to carry a separate pressurized surface element. What’s 
more, an unpressurized MAV cannot be used as a temporary safe-haven in a surface contingency. All of these issues 
can be mitigated, but the mass penalties may outweigh the benefits. 
B. IVA vs. EVA Suits 
Due to the possibility of a sudden cabin depressurization 
it is generally assumed that crew members will ascend in 
either EVA or IVA suits. The choice of ascent suit can impact 
MAV cabin size not only because the EVA suits are 
physically larger than the IVA suits (Figure 3), but also 
because EVA suits will likely be contaminated with surface 
dust which will require additional equipment to control.  
Cabin mockup testing1 identified the EVA suit’s bulky 
design as a potential cabin configuration driver. For example, 
even with their PLSS’s removed, pilots were unable to stand 
side by side in a 2.35 m diameter cylindrical vehicle without 
contact between their suit’s PLSS plates (Figure 4). This 
potentially drives the placement or size of piloting controls, 
windows, and other equipment. 
Simulated microgravity testing performed during the 
Constellation Program also identified problems passing a 
large, pressurized EVA suit through the docking system hatch 
tunnel3. The workaround would have required EVA transfer 
between the Altair lunar lander and Orion in the event of an 
ascent vehicle depressurization. Since testing found no issues 
with the IVA suits, this contingency EVA—as well as the 
need for even longer EVA umbilical hoses stowed in the 
MAV— can be avoided on a Mars ascent simply by 
switching the crew into their IVA suits prior to ascent.  
EVA suits also pose a significant ascent mass penalty 
over the IVA suits. At roughly 75 kg difference between an 
IVA and EVA suit (not including the PLSS), the mass penalty 
for six crew members is about 450 kg; with the 7:1 propellant ratio, that difference adds another 3,150 kg of 
propellant (plus larger propellant tanks, more tank structure, etc.) simply to accommodate the larger suits.   
The downside to acending in IVA suits is that it requires the crew to discard their EVA suits on the surface. This 
poses an immediate problem of how to switch from EVA to IVA suits in a small cabin, and then get the EVA suits 
out of the MAV before ascent. Leaving the suits behind also means that at least two fresh EVA suits would have to 
be available on the in-space return vehicle for EVA contingencies, adding to the overall mission cost. On the other 
hand, planetary protection is simplified if surface EVA suits can be kept out of the MAV altogether, as this 
eliminates the need to scrub Mars regolith from the suits or MAV cabin atmosphere, which would require additional 
MAV equipment mass.  
Ascending in IVA suits poses one significant risk: in the event of a MAV-to-transfer vehicle docking failure, the 
crew cannot simply exit a side hatch and translate externally because the IVA suits do not provide sufficient thermal 
protection for EVA excursions. Several workarounds have been proposed, including a thermal “overcoat” that could 
be used for brief, emergency EVA exposure. Another approach is to break the contingency down into more 
manageable parts, and look at the three failure possibilities: 1) the MAV docks, but the docking hatch becomes 
jammed; 2) the MAV can soft-dock, but not hard-dock; or 3) the MAV cannot even soft-dock. In the event the MAV 
fails to soft-dock, the MAV may be too far from the transit vehicle for an EVA transfer anyway, regardless of which 
suits the crew is wearing. The program will have to either accept the potential crew safety risk, or explore grapple 
fixtures, jet-packs, or other means to mitigate this risk before the suit decision comes into play. In the event the 
MAV can soft-dock, but not hard-dock, crew will still be able to translate through the unpressurized docking tunnel 
in their IVA suits as long as their umbilical hoses are long enough. Finally, the jammed docking hatch contingency 
 
Figure 3. Size comparison of IVA (orange) and 
EVA (white) space suit Concepts 
Figure 4. EVA suit contact in curved cabin
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was addressed in previous studies by assuming the MAV carried a jammed hatch tool kit, estimated at about five 
kilograms mass penalty.   
C. MAV Mission Duration 
Preliminary ascent timelines to a one-sol orbit estimate that crew must remain in the MAV for up to 43 hours, 
assuming a single missed launch opportunity. Crew time inside the MAV could be minimized by ascending to a 
lower orbit, or eliminating the missed launch contingency assumption altogether. Including pre-ascent vehicle 
preparations though, crew is likely to be inside the MAV for at least 24 hours. If the MAV ascends to a higher orbit, 
or serves double-duty as a short surface stay habitat, the crew may be living/working in the MAV for up to a week. 
How long the crew must remain in the MAV greatly impacts MAV mass. If the crew only has to be inside for a 
few hours, they can remain in their spacesuits, with the limiting factor likely the Maximum Absorbency Garment 
(MAG), currently rated for eight hours. Materials and design modification may be able to extend operational use a 
few more hours but current designs require spacesuit doffing to replace a soiled MAG. Because the Constellation 
Program required4 Orion to sustain suited crew in an unpressurized cabin for several days in a worst-case 
contingency, extended in-suit waste management is a NASA technology goal5.  Until then, a practical limit of 12 to 
24 hours for nominal (planned) operations is a reasonable assumption. 
If crew are inside the MAV long enough that they need to replace soiled MAGs, MAV cabin diameter will grow 
dramatically. First, there is the problem of doffing suits. NASA’s Human Integration Design Handbook6 
recommends 6.35 cubic meters (m3) for Space Shuttle-style EVA suit don/doff in micro-gravity. Cabin mockup 
testing performed as part of the Altair project7 confirmed that suit don/doff was a significant cabin volume driver 
(and may be more pronounced in a surface gravity field than in micro-gravity). Note that new rear-entry EVA suit 
concepts require a crew member to pull him/herself up and out of the suit, which drives cabin ceiling height. IVA 
type suits require a bit less volume to don/doff. 
Once the suits are removed, the immediate problem of suit 
stowage must be addressed. As noted, EVA suits are bulkier 
than IVA suits, but a suit takes up about as much cabin volume 
as a crew member. In the worst-case, if all six crew members 
have to remove their EVA suits, the MAV must essentially be 
sized as a 12-crew pressure cabin (Figure 5). MAV volume 
could be optimized for ascent if crew stagger suit don/doff, so 
that only one crew member is out of their suit at any given 
time, but this workaround isn’t practical if the MAV is used for 
surface habitability as well as for ascent, unless the MAV is 
mated to another pressurized element on the surface such as an 
airlock or habitat. 
To prevent damage to the suits, it is preferable to place 
them in stowage bags. The working assumption for early 
Constellation Program studies was 1.04 m3 volume per EVA 
suit, with each stowage bag estimated to be 14.55 kg.  Once 
suits have been doffed and stowed, the next concern is waste 
and hygiene. Privacy for removing soiled MAGs could be 
provided with a simple curtain at relatively small volume 
penalty. Volume needed to dispose of soiled MAGs will 
depend on how long the crew must remain inside the MAV—a 
trash bag is probably sufficient for a single day, but longer durations will require more elaborate disposal methods to 
minimize cabin odor and contamination. Per NASA-STD-30018 a six-crew cabin would accumulate about 54 liters 
of urine after just three days. At that point, a rudimentary toilet may trade well for mass and stowage volume.  
Using the MAV for surface habitability will dramatically increase MAV size, with sleeping expected to be a key 
driver. NASA’s Human Integration Design Handbook6 recommends 2.69 m3 per crew member for activities such as 
sleeping and sheltering. Although sleep bunks can be stacked vertically to save floor space, the cabin has to be at 
least as wide as the tallest crew member to avoid forcing the 
crew to sleep in a fetal position or on an incline. 
One option for reducing MAV diameter may be to limit 
surface crew stature. For example, the difference between 50th 
and 95th percentile male crew statures is about 10.2 cm (Table 
1). Accounting for cabin curvature, this change would drop the 
Figure 5. Cabin Model with six crew and EVA
suits  
Table 1. Crew mass and stature comparison 
 Stature per NASA SSP 50005 
Percentile Female Male 
5th 148.9 cm 169.7 cm 
50th 157.0 cm 179.9 cm 
95th 165.1 cm 190.1 cm
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internal cabin diameter from at least 2.06 m to about 1.885 m diameter. Although that may seem insignificant, 
extended over a 3 m cabin height this simple change translates to an internal cabin volume reduction of more than 
1.6 m3, and a cabin barrel section surface area savings of about 1.65 m2, both of which offer flow-down savings to 
structures, power, thermal protection, and life support subsystems—all multiplied by the 7:1 propellant gear ratio. 
Although limiting crew stature would prompt lively debate, to put things into perspective it should be noted that the 
Apollo 11 surface crew fall just under the 50th percentile stature definition by current NASA standards.  
Although sleep bunks can be folded up during waking hours to 
extend working volume, there is still the problem of where to stow 
equipment at night. Food, clothing, hygiene supplies, a first aid kit, 
science equipment, and EVA consumables (MAGs, spare gloves, etc.) 
must all be stowed inside the habitable volume, along with vehicle 
equipment such as piloting controls and displays, power interface panels, 
or crew umbilical hoses. Figure 6 gives an idea of how much equipment 
is required to support six crew members for a week on the surface, in a 
Habitable MAV. 
Another factor that could affect MAV sizing is whether the crew also 
descends to the surface inside the MAV. If descending in the MAV, the 
crew will almost certainly need recumbent seats (Figure 7) for 
protection. Cabin volume for seats themselves must be accounted for in 
cabin sizing, as well as descent and ascent propellant loads needed for 
seat mass. MAV engineering analysis typically assumes the crew can 
stand during ascent (a hold-over from Constellation Program concepts), 
but the decision will ultimately hinge on crew safety. Preliminary 
estimates for a 3,623 kg crew cabin, with 0.80 stage mass fraction, and 
100 kN thrust engines is about 1.5 g at the end of the first stage—
relatively gentle compared to the Space Shuttle’s lift-off, but potentially 
dangerous for a crew that’s spent more than 500 days at reduced Martian 
gravity following a six month transit in microgravity. 
Orion-type recumbent seats, sized for Earth re-entry, are estimated at 
up to 27 kg each, but lower mass seats may be adequate for Mars ascent 
or descent. Note that seats may be removed from the MAV after landing 
(unless they are needed during ascent), but this may drive MAV cabin 
hatch design. To reduce overall landed mass, common seating might be 
shared between the MAV and surface rovers, though again that may 
drive either seat or hatch design to allow seat relocation between the two 
vehicles. 
Finally, some consideration must be given to return cargo, which may be as much9 as 250 kg. Conventional 
wisdom says there’s no reason to ascend more return cargo than what Orion can accommodate (which may be as 
low as 100 kg), but it’s possible that Mars return science samples could be diverted to another destination (an 
orbiting outpost, for example), or designed for a separate Earth re-entry. To protect science sample integrity, as well 
as to protect both the crew and Earth from forward contamination, science sample containers must be sealed and 
decontaminated before entering either the MAV or the orbiting transit vehicle. Returning science samples could be 
stowed outside the MAV pressure cabin, which eliminates the landed mass penalty for sealing/decontamination 
equipment. On the other hand, this will require an EVA transfer from the MAV to the Earth transit vehicle, which 
may result in a net mass increase. 
D. MAV Ingress/Egress 
How the crew gets into or out of the MAV has profound implications on mission element architecture. There are 
at least five possible ingress/egress operations in a crewed Mars surface mission: 
1) Transferring from Orion or an Earth transit vehicle into the MAV in microgravity (if descending in the 
MAV). 
2) Egressing the MAV to perform a surface EVA or transit to another surface asset (such as a habitat) in Mars 
gravity.  
3) Ingressing/egressing the MAV in Mars gravity to retrieve logistics supplies or stow return cargo. 
4) Ingressing the MAV in Mars gravity to ascend to Mars orbit. 
5) Egressing the MAV in microgravity to return to Orion or the Earth transit vehicle. 
 
Figure 6. Equipment for six crew for 
a week 
 
 
Figure 7. Six crew in recumbent seats 
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Current ingress/egress methods include EVA hatches, IVA tunnels (Figure 8), and Suit Ports (Figure 9).  
There are three key considerations for MAV ingress/egress design. 
First, which suits will the crew be wearing during ingress/egress? As 
noted above, a pressurized IVA suit can pass through a standard 
exploration docking hatch, but a pressurized EVA suit requires a larger 
hatch. On the other hand, IVA suits are unsuitable for surface 
operations, and cannot be used with EVA hatches alone. Second, 
where will crew be changing from IVA to EVA suits, or vice versa? If 
the MAV is large enough for all crew members to change into their 
EVA suits, then an EVA hatch is acceptable. But if the MAV isn’t 
large enough to get out of their IVA suits, the crew can’t explore the 
surface or get to another vehicle without a tunnel, suit port, or attached 
airlock. Finally, how much dust can be tolerated inside the MAV? 
Apollo experience10warns that opening an EVA hatch directly to the 
surface will bring surface dust into the ascent vehicle. This will drive 
MAV cabin design and equipment mass to prevent Martian dust from 
migrating back into Orion and eventually to Earth, in violation of 
planetary protection protocols11. 
 
1. EVA Hatch 
EVA hatches have the benefit of relatively low mass and high 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL). But because an EVA hatch would 
require MAV depressurization for every ingress/egress, everything in 
the cabin would have to be rated for extended Mars surface atmosphere 
exposure, and all crew members would have to suit up even if only one 
was actually leaving the cabin—which means the MAV would still 
have to be big enough for all crew members to ingress/egress their 
suits together. Altair project mockup testing found that even three 
EVA suited crew could stand together in a relatively small 1.8 m 
diameter cabin (Figure 10). However, getting into and out of their 
EVA suits was hampered by a rear-entry suit design that requires the 
PLSS hatch to swing open laterally for suit doffing (Figure 11). In 
practice, this either forces the cabin diameter to grow to accommodate 
PLSS hatch swing, or it will drive a fundamental design change to the 
EVA suits.  These issues aside, the biggest drawback to an EVA hatch 
is that it will be more difficult to keep dust out of the MAV or prevent 
Martian dust from migrating back to Orion, and eventually to Earth. 
 
2. Suit Port 
Suit ports offer the promise of dust mitigation by keeping dusty 
suits outside the cabin, but current protocol still requires an EVA 
hatch to get the suits outside for the first EVA, and back inside after 
the final EVA. This is primarily because current designs don’t provide 
enough structural support to protect the suits from ascent/descent 
loads or potential thruster plume impingement. Concepts to address 
these problems have been proposed, but add even more mass to each 
suit port (which are already about 100 kg each). Even if the structural 
problem is resolved, an EVA hatch is still required for an 
incapacitated crew member contingency, since it may not be possible 
to pull an unconscious person up through the suit’s rear-entry hatch to 
safety.  
At nearly one meter centerline-to-centerline spacing between suit 
ports, a small MAV cabin diameter is unlikely to provide sufficient 
real estate for more than two suit ports. This poses operational timeline impacts in getting four or six member crews 
in or out of the vehicle. Crews could ingress two at a time, but once the first two are inside, their suits would have to 
be removed from the suit ports before the next two crew members could ingress. Once detached from the suit port, 
Figure 8. IVA Tunnel 
Figure 9. Suit port concept 
Figure 10. Three crew in 1.8 m 
diameter cabin 
Figure 11. PLSS management issues 
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an empty suit can be damaged if the water inside freezes, which means additional thermal conditioning mass will be 
needed outside the vehicle for suit stowage—exacerbating what is already a poor mass trade for the suit ports. 
Worse, to protect against a contingency where the MAV engines fail to ignite and crew need to retreat back to a 
habitable element, the MAV may have to keep one or two EVA suits attached to its suit ports until lift-off, further 
adding complexity and mass. 
Although suit ports make sense for frequent excursions from a relatively large surface asset (such as a rover or 
habitat), suit ports do not seem to be a good fit for the MAV. 
 
3. Tunnel 
For architectures where another element provides 
habitability function (such as a rover or habitat), or 
where an airlock module is paired with the MAV, 
retractable tunnels (Figure 12) are an attractive option. 
By pushing the suit don/doff and EVA operations to an 
element that remains on the surface, MAV ascent mass 
and dust can be minimized. Although a tunnel is likely to 
pose a significant descended mass impact, the 7:1 
propellant penalty does not apply if the tunnel remains on 
the surface. What’s more, retractable tunnels allow 
surface assets to be re-configured, built up over time, or 
reconfigured as needed.   
Ideally, pressurized tunnels would provide a shirt-
sleeve crew transfer path between elements. The tunnel 
concept may work unpressurized as well, but would 
require umbilical hoses at least as long as the tunnel. A tunnel would also allow MAV crews to discard their EVA 
suits in a thermally-conditioned, secure element for later mission re-use or scavenge, rather than discarding them on 
the surface. This protects the crew in a contingency scenario where the MAV engines fail to ignite; crew can simply 
retreat back through the tunnel to the habitable element for troubleshooting. Strictly speaking, a tunnel does not have 
to be retractable but one-time use options such as pyrotechnic detachment may not make sense for a long-duration 
mission where surface elements will be re-used or reconfigured over time.  
One downside to tunnels is that they may be awkward when moving between elements at different elevations, as 
depicted in Figure 12, though it may still be safer than EVA crews climbing down an exposed ladder. Another 
disadvantage is that pressurized tunnels—or unpressurized tunnels with long umbilical hoses—will require a robust 
environmental control and life support system feeding the tunnel from at one or both of the two mated elements. 
III. Conclusion 
Based on the observations noted above, the following steps are recommended to minimize MAV cabin mass, 
thus reducing overall mission mass: 
 
1) Limit MAV usage to 24 consecutive hours or less. 
2) Abandon EVA suits in a surface asset and ascend in the MAV wearing IVA suits. 
3) Limit MAV functionality to ascent only, rather than dual-use ascent/habitat functions. 
4) Ingress/egress the MAV via a retractable tunnel to another pressurized surface asset. 
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